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[So F. No. 18117. In Bank. Mar. 21, 1952.] 
HERBERT BECK, as Administrator, etc., Appellant, V. 
WEST COAST LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et a1., 
lWspondents; JETTIE KNOLL, Intervener and Re-
spondent. 
[1] Insurance-Proceeds and Beneficiaries-Effect of Wrongful 
Act of Beneficiary.-A beneficiary under a life insurance policy 
who murders the insured may neither receive nor retain pro-
ceeds of the policy, since it would be unconscionable to allow 
him to profit from his own wrong. 
[2] Id.-Proceeds and Beneficiaries-Effect of Wrongful Act of 
Beneficiary.-Although principal beneficiary who murders in-
sured is disqualified to receive or retain proceeds of insurance, 
the insurer is not thereby relieved from liability unless the 
policy so provides. 
[3] Trusts-Constructive Trusts-Wrongful Acquisition of Prop-
erty.-Where one has by his own wrong obtained the legal title 
to property, a trust as to such property will be imposed on him 
in favor of the party injured, this principle being based on the 
maxim that no one may profit by his own wrong. (See Civ. 
Code, §§ 2224, 3517.) 
[4] Insurance-Proceeds and Beneficiaries-E:lfect of Wrongful 
Act of Beneficiary.-Where the primary beneficiary of an in-
surance poliey murders the insured, all doubts as to who would 
have received the proceeds but for the murder must be re-
solved against the murderer. 
[5] Id.-Proceeds and Beneficiaries-Construction of PoliCJ'.-
Because the beneficiary clause of a life insurance policy in 
which the insured has reserved the right to change bene-
ficiaries is donative and testamentary in character, the intent 
of the insured .as expressed by the language which she used 
should be given effect so far as possible. 
[6] Id.-Proceeds and Beneficiaries-Effect of Wrongful Act of 
Beneficiary.-Where life insurance policy designates insured's 
husband as primary beneficiary "if living," otherwise to a 
named alternative beneficiary, and husband by reason of his 
murder of the insured cannot receive the proceeds of the 
[1] Murder or killing of insured by beneficiary or by a third 
person who procures the policy as affecting life insurance or its 
proceeds, notes, 70 A.L.R. 1539; 91 A.L.R. 1486. See, also, Cal.Jur., 
Insurance, § 124; Am.Jm., Insurance, § 1310. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,4,6] Insurance, § 231; [3] Trusts, 
§ 137; [5] Insurance, § 219. 
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policy. tht' Illtl'rnlltin' I)('nplicilll"~' rather than the insured's 
t'~ta te is pntitlpd to 8lwh procp(,ds, since the insured has clearly 
indit'll«'d her intcnt that I\n~' interest her estate might have 
in the procPt'ds i5hould 1)(' SubOl'dinlltc to the intt>rest of the 
nltprnative beneficiary . 
• \PPEAL frolll a judg'llll'nt of the Superior Court of the 
City ant! Count~· of San Francisco. Daniel R. Shoemaker, 
.J udge. Affirmed. 
.-
Aetion by adlllinistrator of insured to recover proceeds of 
a life policy, ill which alternative beneficiary intervened . 
. r udgment on pleadings for intervener as against claims of 
original plaintiff, affirmed. 
Chas. I. Rosin for Appellant. 
Panl Friedman for Intprvener and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On May 23, 1946, the West Coast Life 
Insurance 'Company issued a life insurance policy to Mrs. 
D. A. Downey. The beneficiary clause provided that the 
proceeds be paid to "David Albert Downey-Husband, if liv-
ing, otherwise to Jettie Knoll-Friend of the Insured." The 
insured reserved the right to change beneficiaries. On JUly 
18. 1!J47. the primary beneficiary murdered the insured in 
Colorado. He has been convictrd of the crime and sentenced 
to life imprisonment. (Downey v. People, 121 Colo. 307 
[215 P.2d 892].) Herbert Beck, administrator of Mrs. Down-
ey's estate. brought this action against the insurer to re-
cover the proceeds of the policy. In its answer the insurer 
alleged that the cause of death was not within the coverage 
of the policy and asked that the policy be cancelled for fraud. 
Lt'a,'e was then granted to Jettie Knoll, the alternative bene-
ficiary, to intervene in the action. Beck and Knoll pach 
mowd for judgment on the pleadings against each other, 
and the trial court granted Knoll's motion and ordered that 
the aetion procped with Knoll as sole plaintiff against the 
insurer. Reek has appealed from the judgment that he has 
no interest in the policy. 
[1] Under the terms of the policy the murderer is en-
titled to the proceeds. but since it would be unconscionable 
to allow him to profit from his own wrong, he may neither 
rreeiw nor retain them. (Drown v. New Amsterdam Cas-
ualty Co., 175 Cal. 21, 23 [165 P. 5] ; West Coast Life Ins. 
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Co. v. Crawford, 58 Cal.App.2d 771, 773 [138 P.2d 384]; 
sct', also, eases collected in 91 A.L.R. 1486.) [2] Unless 
the policy so pro\'ides, however, the insurer is not relievpd 
of liability beeaus(~ of the disqualification of the principal 
beneficiary. (Meyer v. Johnson, 115 Cal.App. 646, 650 [2 
P.2<1 4:)6 J ; WI'st Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 58 Cal.App. 
!!tl 77], 786 [138 1'.2d 384] ; see Vance on Insurance [2d ed.] 
p. 599.) It is therefore necessary to tletermine whether the 
proceeds should be paid to the named alternative beneficiary 
or to the estate of the insured. 
The general principle that precludes a wrongdoer from 
unjustly enriching himself has been codified in section 22241 
and 35172 of the Civil Code and applied in a variety of 
situations. [3] "[W] here the tlefendant has by his own 
wrong obtained the legal title to property; a trust as to 
such property will be imposed upon him in favor of the 
party injured. This principle is a familiar one and is based 
upon the maxim, which has been carried into our code (Civ. 
Code, sec. 3517), that no one may profit by his own wrong. 
Tht' instances of its application are as various nearly as 
the ways in which property can be wrongfully acquired." 
(Brazil v. Silva, 181 Cal. 490, 494 (185 P. 174] ; see, also, 
Sem's v. Rule, 27 Ca1.2d 131, 139 [163 P.2d 443] ; Weinstein 
\'. Moers, 207 Cal. 534, 541-542 [279 P. 444] ; Smith v. Lom-
bard, 201 Cal. 518, 527-528 [258 P. 55] ; Brison v. Brison, 75 
Cal. 525, 526-527 [17 P. 689, 7 Am.St.Rep. 189] ; 11 A.L.R.2d 
808; 159 A.L.R. 997; 102 A.L.R. 589.) Once it is deter-
mined that the "Tongdoer may not receive or retain the 
property, the question arises as to who is the injured party 
or "the person who would otherwise have had it" (Civ. 
Code, § 2224.) Frequently the answer is obvious. Thus 
ill the Silva ease, where the sole beneficiary under the will 
fraudulently prevented the testator from revoking it, it was 
clear that the heirs wer(' the injured parties. Again, when 
one person com'eys his property to another in reliance on 
a fl'audlll!'nt promise to hold it in trust for thp transferor, 
the latter is the one who would have had it but for the 
fraud. (Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. ;)25 [17 P. 689, 7 Am.St. 
H!'p. 189].) [4] The problem is more difficult, however, 
1" One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, 
th(' violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some 
other and vetter right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing 
gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it .• , 
0, 'N 0 one can take advantage of his own wrong.' 1 
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when the primary beneficiary of an insurance policy mur-
ders the insured. It will ordinarily be impossible to deter-
mine who would have received the proceeds but for the 
murder. The lllurderrr himself might have received them 
through the natural death of the insured. The insured might 
have outlived the murderer but not the alternative beneficiary, 
or the insured might have changed the beneficiaries altogether. 
If the alternative beneficiary were older than both the pri-
mary beneficiary and the insured, the probabilities would 
favor the heirs or legatees of the insured as those most likely 
to take but for the murder. In any event all doubts must 
be resolved against the murderer. Whatever the proba-
bility that he would have received the proceeds had he not 
murdered the insured, he cannot be allowed to insure that 
result by his own wrongful conduct. (Cleaver v. Mutual 
Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (1892), 1 Q.B. 147, 160; see 3 
Scott on Trusts, § 494.1, p. 2407.) 
As between the estate of the insured and the alterna-
tive beneficary there are three possible solutions. It has been 
held that the absence of any express provision in the policy 
permitting the alternative beneficiary to take, when the pri-
mary beneficiary is still alive, requires that the proceeds 
be paid to the estate of the insured. (Beck v. Downey, 191 
F.2d 150, 152.) The choice might also be made on the 
basis of mortality tables and the proceeds paid to the per-
son or persons who would be most likely to take had the 
murder not been committed. The third solution is to allow 
the alternative beneficiary to recover the proceeds. (Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39 F.Supp, 228; Neff v. 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. (Ohio Common Pleas), ' 
96 N.E.2d 53, 54-55; United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F.Supp. 
847, 854; Sharpless v. Grand Lodge Ancient Order of United 
Workmen, 135 Minn. 35, 37 [159 N.W. 1086, L.R.A. 1917B 
670] ; see 3 Scott on Trusts, § 494.1, p. 2407; Costigan, note, 
9 Ill.L.Rev. 505, 509; Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wil-
fully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 
715, 742.) 
[5] We have concluded that the third solution should 
be adopted. Because the beneficiary clause of a life insurance 
policy in which the insured has reserved the right to change 
beneficiaries is donative and testamentary in character (Grimm 
v. Grimm, 26 Ca1.2d 173, 175-176 [157 P.2d 841] ; Landrum 
v. Landrum's Admx., 186 Ky. 775, 779 [218 S.W. 274] ; Con-
tinental Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 42 Conn. 60, 65 [19 Am. 
) 
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Rep. 530]), the intent of the insured as expressed by the 
language that she used should be given effect so far as pos-
sible. (Estate of Lefrane, 38 Ca1.2d 289, 295-296 [239 P.2d 
617], and cases cited; see, also, Prob. Code, § 101.) Al-
though her expressed intent that her husband receive the 
proceeds cannot be given effect, the policy names the one 
she wished to take if her husband could not. It stated that 
the proceeds should be paid to the alternative beneficiary, 
if the primary beneficiary predeceased the insured. Thus, 
in the type of disability that would naturally be anticipated 
by the insured, the alternative beneficiary was preferred 
over the e&tate of the insured. [6] In this case there oc-
curred the only other possible contingency in which the 
primary beneficiary would be under a disability equivalent 
to actual death. The insured has clearly indicated her in-
tent that any interest her estate might have in the pro-
ceeds of the policy should be subordinate to the interest of 
the alternative beneficiary. This intent is recognized by . 
a holding that the alternative beneficiary may recover the 
proceeds. A holding that the estate of the insured is en-
titled to the proceeds would not only defeat this intent, 
but would also enable the murderer to deprive the alternative 
beneficiary of her opportunity' to take in preference to the 
estate by foreclosing the possibility that the murderer might 
predecease the insured. The rule that prevents his profit-
ing by his own wrong should not be invoked in such a way 
as to prejudice the rights of the alternative beneficiary. "In 
a word, it appears to me that the crime of one person may 
prevent that person from the assertion of what would other-
wise be a right, and may accelerate or beneficially affect 
the rights of third persons,but can never prejudice or in-
juriously affect those rights." (Fry, L. J. in Oleaver v. 
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (1892), 1 Q.B. 147, 160.) 
It is contended, however, that the court may not award 
the proceeds to the alternative beneficiary on the theory 
of enforcing a constructive trust against the murderer on 
the ground that the doctrine of constructive trusts does not 
apply to this situation in this state. In the case of intestate 
succession there is a specific statutory provision preventing 
a convicted murderer from succeeding to any part of the 
estate of his victim and providing how the murderer's share 
should be distributed. (Prob. Code, § 258.) Although there 
is no such specific provision governing the disposition of the 
proceeds of life insurance, it may be contended that the pub-
) 
) 
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lie policy expressed in the Probate Code prevents the pas-
sage of either equitable or legal title to the murderer. Since 
we are 110t here concerned with any possible interest of a 
bona fide purchaser for value from the murderer, it is un-
necessary to decide whethl.'r or not legal title passed to him. 
Even if it is assumed that the legal title did not pass, an 
appropriate rule of law must be applied to determine upon 
whom it devolved. A refusal to allow the legal title to go 
to the murderer under the terms of the policy would present 
the same problem as that created by prohibiting him from 
taking the equitable title, and accordingly, the same con-
siderations that lead the chancellor to select the alternative 
beneficiary as the beneficiary of a constructive trust, would 
lead to a rule of law that the legal title devolves upon her. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., con-
curred. 
EDMONDS, J.-The parties agree that there is no ambi-
guity in the beneficiary clause of the policy which would jus-
tify the admission of extrinsic evidence to explain the mean-
ing of the words used in it. The decisive question, therefore, 
is the very narrow one of textual interpretation. In my opin-
ion, Ol~ly by ignoring the clear and unequivocal language of 
the policy of insurance lllay the conclusion be reached that 
the alternath-e beneficiary is entitled to the proceeds despite 
the fact that the contingency conditioning her right has 
never occurred. 
The decision is placed upon the ground that "the policy 
names the one . . . [the insured J wished to take if her hus-
band could not." In effect, the clause "if living" is enlarged 
But the provisions of the policy do not express any intent 
to mean "if living and not otherwise disqualified to take." 
that Jettie Knoll should be the beneficiary if David Downey is 
!lisqualified for some reason other than his death. The con-
tract specifically states, as the only contingency upon which 
.Jettie Knoll could become entitled to its proceeds, that David 
Downey be not living. 
"In the construction of a[n] ... instrument, the office 
of the judge is simply -to ascertain and declare what is in 
terms or in substance contained thereon, 'IIot to insert what 
has been omitte.d . .. ." (Code Civ. Proc .. § 1858 [italics 
aoded},) In violation of this salutary rule, on the basis of 
) 
) 
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conjecture, an omission is supplied which may have been 
either accidental or intentional. 
Most of the reasoning to support the decision in favor of 
the alternative beneficiary is basl'u upon the doctrine of 
constructive trusts. The question as to whether the doctrine 
is here applicable is not dccided, but upon a theory which 
the court refuses to expressly apply, it is determined that 
J ettie Knoll is "the person who would otherwise have had" 
the property. 'l'his, says the opinion, is one of three possible 
solutions to the problem. It is chosen in preference to a 
construction that the alternative beneficiary shall take only 
when the express condition of her right to do so has been met. 
To determine" the person who would otherwise have had" 
the property without giving effect to the unambiguous lan-
guage of the contract is an impossible task. The insured 
reserved the right to change the beneficiary. Who can say 
what disposition Lila Downey might have made of the pro-
ceeds had she lived f She had the unqualified right to name 
the payee of the policy by designating the beneficiary. Under 
these circumstances, even if the doctrine of constructive 
trusts is applicable, the ultimate question is: Who is entitled 
to the proceeds under the express terms of the contract? 
Sound public policy dictates that a murderer should not .be 
permitted to profit from his own wrong. (Drown v. New 
Amsterdam Casualty Co., 175 Cal. 21 [165 P. 5] ; see cases 
collected in 91 A.L.R. 1486; 70 A.L.R. 1539.) However, 
because that rule bars David Downey from receiving the 
insurance money, this court is not thereby at liberty to dis-
regard the otherwise valid provisions of the policy. 
To reinforce its conclusion. the majority opinion relies 
upon a number of cases from other jurisdictions. With one 
exception, each of them is distinguishable upon its facts. 
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39 F.Supp. 228, 
the administrator of the estate of the deceased insured made 
no claim upon the proceeds of the policy in which a contin-
gent beneficiary was named. The court was not faced with, 
and did not consiller, adverse claims as between the insured's 
estate and the contingent beneficiary. The only question 
there decided was "whether Beatrice McDavid took the life 
of her husband, Israel McDavid, under such circumstances 
that she cannot receive the proceeds of these policies as she 
otherwise would have done." . (P. 229.) 
In United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F.Supp. 847, the mur-
\ 
J 
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derer was a contingent beneficiary, and the victim the prin-
cipal beneficiary, of a matured policy of insurance. Of 
necessity the court construed a governing federal statute 
(38 U.S. C., § 802 [hl ). To determine the rights of the par-
ties, it looked to the legislative purpose to provide assistance 
to persons dependent upon the insured. There was no con-
test between the estate of either the insured or the principal 
beneficiary and any contingent beneficiary because the stat- . 
ute expressly provided that no installments of insurance i 
should be paid to the heirs or legal representatives of the 
insured or of any beneficiary. (38 U.S.C., § 802[j].) Sharp-
less v. Grand Lodge Ancient Order of United Workmen, 135 
Minn. 35 [159 N.W. 1086, L.R.A. 1917B 670], did not involve 
a dispute between the insured's estate and a contingent 
beneficiary. 
Only Neff v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. (Ohio 
Common Pleas), 96 N.E.2d 53, offers support for the present 
decision. The reasoning of that decision, as in the present 
one, entirely ignores the unambiguous language of the con-
tract. Certainly the decision of a nisi prius court is not here 
controlling. 
The majority opinion also cites, but refuses to follow, the 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in Beck v. Downey, 191 F.2d 150. (Petition for cer-
tiorari to the United States Supreme Court now pending.) 
This is another case which concerns the right to the proceeds 
of insurance upon the life of Mrs. Downey. The district court 
awarded judgment to the alternative beneficiary in policies 
which read: "to David A. Downey, husband, as beneficiary, 
if living; otherwise to Jennie B. Downey, mother-in-law, as 
contingent beneficiary." The judgment was reversed with 
directions to enter one in favor of the administrator of the 
estate of the insured. 
The majority opinion of this court inaccurately states the 
rule of Beck v. Downey to be "that the absence of any ex-
press provision in the policy permitting the alternative bene-
fic'iary to take, when the primary beneficiary is still alive, 
requires that the proceeds be paid to the estate of the in-
sured." More correctly, the holding is that the contract must 
be given effect according to its plain terms which provide 
that the contingent beneficiary can take only if the principal 
beneficiary is not alive. The court analyzed the rights of the 
parties as follows: "The contingency, which was a condition 
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that David A. Downey be not 'living' at the time of the death 
of the insured. In the ordinary meaning of the word' living,' 
the contingency conditioning Jennie B. Downey's right to 
the fund never occurred. For when Lila L. Downey died . . ., 
David A. Downey was 'living.' The public policy that pre-
vented David A. Downey from receiving the proceeds does 
not produce the result of vesting the fund in the contingent 
beneficiary. . . . 
"The words 'if living' must be interpreted in their ordinary 
common sense meaning, namely, that the insured intended 
the proceeds to go to her mother-in-law, if the beneficiary was 
not alive but was 'dead and buried.' Had there been an in-
tent to have the proceeds go to the contingent beneficiary in 
the event of any incapacity of the beneficiary, while alive, 
to take the proceeds, plain language to that effect could and 
certainly would have been used. We think the language of 
the policies was clear and unequivocal." (P. 152.) 
The language construed in Beck v. Downey, supra, is sub-
stantially the same as that here under consideration. The 
two cases are identical in all material respects. They concern 
the same deceased and the same provision of policies upon her 
life. The reasoning of the federal court is equally applicable 
to the rights of Beck and Jettie Knoll. Although that court 
was not applying California law and its decision is not here 
controlling, it is anomalous for the two highest courts in this 
jurisdiction to reach opposite conclusions upon the same 
facts by applying the same general principles of common law. 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment with direc-
tions to the trial court to enter a judgment ordering that 
Herbert Beck, administrator, is, as against Jettie Knoll, the 
owner of and entitled to the possession of the proceeds of the 
life insurance policy; that J ettie Knoll take nothing by her 
complaint in intervention; and that the other issues pre-
sented by the answer and cross-complaint of West Coast Life 
Insurance Company to the complaint of Beck, as administra-
tor, be tried solely between them. 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 17, 
1952. Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
